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Introduction 
On 4 October 1794 the Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant received a royal order 
declaring that in his Religion within the Bounds of Reason Alone and associated 
writings he had “abused his philosophy for the purpose of distorting and disparaging 
several principal and fundamental doctrines of Holy Scripture and of Christianity”, and 
enjoining him to cease from such conduct.1 This was Kant’s second brush with the 
authority of the Prussian state. The first had come in June 1792 when the second of the 
essays that would be collected in the Religion had been rejected by the government’s 
Immediate Examination Commission, where he had chosen to send it.2 The proximate 
context for these events was provided by the issuing on 9 July 1788 of a “Special Edict 
by his Royal Prussian Majesty concerning the Religious Constitution of the Prussian 
State”, generally known as the Prussian Religious Edict or the Wöllner Edict, after its 
immediate author, Johann Christoph Wöllner, the Minister for Religious Affairs. As we 
shall see in more detail below, the Edict was dedicated to maintaining the legally 
ordered system of religious confessions, and to preventing particular forms of 
theological innovation and proselytising, to the extent that these threatened the 
confessional balance. This Edict was followed on 19 December 1788 by a “Renewed 
Censorship Edict for the Prussian States exclusive of Silesia”, which reaffirmed the 
variegated arrangements for vetting Prussian-published printed works, as these had 
been laid down in the prior Edicts of May 1749 and June 1772.3 There was probably no 
strict legal requirement for Kant to send the first two essays of the Religion to the 
Examination Commission, as these were initially written as articles for J. E. Biester’s 
Berlinische Monatsschrift, and censorship of journals was generally assigned to 
universities, not the Superior Consistory for which the Commission was acting (at the 
King’s insistence). Kant’s motive in going out of his way to seek the vetting of works 
which he knew courted attention for religious innovation is the first uncertainty of 
several that mark this historical episode. 
Uncertainty, however, is not a characteristic of the way in which this set of 
events has been understood by philosophers and philosophical historians. The terms of 
the dominant modern interpretation were set by Wilhelm Dilthey’s template study of 
1890. Treating the issue as an unambiguous clash between the progress of scientific 
reason and an obscurantist church and state, Dilthey writes as if the historical 
significance of the Edicts lay in the fact that a particular philosopher would fall foul of 
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them. According to Dilthey, by uncovering the rational moral core of biblical 
Christianity, Kant had reconciled the longstanding conflict between science and 
positive religion, allowing the latter to be seen as the historical husk from which a 
“pure religion of reason” would emerge. Those who framed and enforced the Religious 
Edict, with its prohibition on public religious innovation, were simply perpetuating 
humanity’s self-incurred immaturity and blocking the path to Aufklärung (Dilthey 
1890). The longevity of the terms set by Dilthey’s study is shown by the fact that they 
continue to inform Allen Wood’s General Introduction to the Cambridge University 
Press edition of Kant’s writings on Religion and Rational Theology, part of the new 
standard English edition of Kant’s works. Having already identified the rationalist 
theologians (‘Neologians’) with the Aufklärung, and Wöllner and the Frederick 
William II as its “enemies”, Wood offers the following overview of Kant’s context: 
Unlike some of his associates, Wöllner was not unaware of the ugly 
aspects of what he was doing, but he was resolute in his enforcement of 
orthodoxy. The conservatives argued that public order required that the 
masses be taught a religion which is doctrinally uniform and orthodox, 
pure of subversive rationalistic glosses. … To allow individual thinkers 
to teach their own religious doctrines, contrary to traditional dogma, 
would lead inevitably to people’s questioning the demands of morality, 
hence to the breakdown of that civil order which it was the 
government’s duty to maintain. Kant’s enlightenment principle … that 
all individuals have not only a right but a moral duty to think for 
themselves, obedient to the universal principles prescribed to them by 
their reason, thus seemed to the conservatives like a recipe for civil 
anarchy. (Wood 1996: xviii-xix) 
It is possible to identify three central assumptions informing this view of the 
events.4 First, it is assumed that a state or a church is only justified in prescribing 
statutes that could have been prescribed by the people themselves, acting in accordance 
with rational principles. If, as Dilthey and Wood claim, the Religious Edict was 
attempting to impose orthodoxy for reasons of state independent of such principles, 
then it may be regarded as anti-enlightenment and, indeed, illegitimate. Second, it is 
assumed that Kant’s rational-theological writings were neither a direct intervention in 
concrete religion nor themselves instances of positive theology, representing instead 
the Aufklärung of historical religion and theology, through the philosophical recovery 
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of the a priori principles of a universal moral religion. Finally, it is assumed that the 
core figure of Kant’s philosophical theology — his conception of the progressive 
hermeneutic refinement of a rational morality from the historical and doctrinal husks of 
biblical Christianity — can be applied reflexively to Kant’s encounter with the 
Prussian state’s censorship regime. This allows Kant to be seen not just as a 
philosopher advancing a doctrine regarding the unfolding of reason in history, but as 
the actual incarnation of an a priori reason unfolding itself in time. The attempt to 
censor him will thus be regarded as marking the point at which the rational Aufklärung 
encounters the constricting ‘husks’ of a state and church dedicated to man’s merely 
empirical governance. Not the least remarkable effect of these assumptions is that the 
Religious Edict floats free of its particular historical role in enunciating Prussia’s 
religious constitution, appearing simply as a generic bulwark against enlightenment 
reason. For its part, Kant’s rational theology outstrips historical calibration altogether, 
appearing instead as the temporal incarnation of a pure reason against which all 
positive historical arrangements will be measured and found wanting. 
There are, however, significant counter-currents to the dominant viewpoint 
which, were they to coalesce, would amount to a major revision of our understanding 
of the Religious Edict, the North German (Protestant) Aufklärung, and the historical 
significance of Kant’s encounter with Prussian censorship. There are two main 
research tendencies to be noted. In the first place, there is an approach which, simply 
by being more historical and descriptive, takes a less hyperbolic view of the Religious 
Edict and the Aufklärung itself. In treating the Edict as an instrument aimed at the 
controlled religious toleration of the public confessions, this approach turns Kant’s 
near-censoring into the unintended and peripheral by-product of a broad and 
longstanding Prussian Religionspolitik.5 Further, by recovering the religious focus of 
the North German Aufklärung itself — its fundamentally Protestant rejection of 
sacramentalist ‘supersition’, its fears of Catholic proselytising, its violent public 
arguments over the degree to which sacramental Protestantism could or should be 
turned into a rational natural religion — this research has begun to transform the view 
of Aufklärung as the free individual use of universal reason.6 Secondly, while less 
developed and more internally diverse than this historical recontextualisation of the 
Edict, there is a significant body of scholarship sceptical of the standard view of Kant’s 
philosophical theology — as a transcendental reflection on positive theology removed 
from all concrete religious entanglements. While some of this scholarship has located 
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the religious dimension of Kant’s philosophical theology in his long-marginalised 
positive metaphysics (Chang 1996), other work, some of it indicative of Catholic re-
engagement with the arch-Protestant philosopher, has focused on relocating Kant in the 
context of positive theological debate (Rossi and Wreen 1991; Ricken and Marty 1992; 
Lawrence 2002).7 The present writer has contributed to this revisionist scholarship by 
approaching Kant’s moral and religious philosophy as a ‘way of life’ — in the manner 
of the descriptive histories of religion and philosophy undertaken by Peter Brown and 
Pierre Hadot — thereby focusing on the role of Kantian anthropology and spiritual 
exercises in a certain practice of ‘spiritual grooming’ (Hunter 2001: 274-363; Hunter 
2002). Despite its diversity of approach, this second body of scholarship allows us to 
call into question the standard separation of Kant’s philosophical theology from 
positive confessional theology, showing how Kant’s Religion and associated writings 
can be approached as a positive theological intervention in the concrete religious 
culture of late eighteenth-century rationalist Protestantism.8 
If the first body of revisionist work is leading us to question whether the 
Religious Edict was as unenlightened as it has appeared in the standard account, then 
the second is beginning to indicate that Kant’s philosophical theology might be quite 
far removed from his own notion of Aufklärung, as the free use of reason in accordance 
with universal principles. Thus far, these two lines of scholarship have largely run 
parallel, despite their evident historical and methodological affinities. In this paper I 
offer a sketch of how they might be brought into convergence, so that the Religious 
Edict, seen as public-law instrument for the management of religious peace, might 
provide a new context for Kant’s theology, now seen as an unsettling public 
intervention in a concrete religious and political culture. I shall begin by outlining a 
revisionist account of the Religious Edict as a representative instance of Prussian 
‘enlightened absolutist’ Religionspolitik (Section I); then move on to a sketch of Kant’s 
philosophical theology as a rational religious intervention in the volatile North German 
religious Aufklärung (Section II); before concluding with some remarks on the 
historical significance of Kant’s religious and political metaphysics in the context of 
his encounter with the censors (Section III). 
I. The Religious Edict and the North (Protestant) German Aufklärung 
We can begin by clearing up some of the more evident misunderstandings regarding 
the Edict and its relation to the religious Aufklärung. The standard view, as represented 
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in Wood’s Cambridge introduction, treats the Edict as an attempt to enforce religious 
orthodoxy for the purposes of social control, hence as a measure that was bound to 
repress the Aufklärung, understood as the free use of reason in religious matters. 
Several rather evident features of the Edict, however, make the wide acceptance of this 
view puzzling. 9 
In the first place, there can be little doubt that rather than attempting to impose 
an orthodox religion, the Edict’s central concern was to maintain the plurality of 
confessions that had been recognised by Imperial public law, which formed the basis 
of state religious toleration in Prussia. Article 1 of the Edict thus commands that “all 
three main confessions of the Christian religion, namely the Reformed, Lutheran and 
Roman Catholic, should be maintained and protected in their prior condition, in 
accordance with the severally declared edicts and orders of our blessed predecessors, 
remaining in force in all our provinces”. Article 2 then extends this same protection to 
the “the sects previously publicly tolerated in our states”: the Jewish nation, the 
Herrnhutter, the Mennonites, and the Bohemian Brethren (Kemper 1996: 227). 
We can further observe that the Edict was not directed in any uniform manner 
against individual religious freedom. The Edict stipulates repeatedly that citizens have 
the right to believe what they like in private, and should not be hindered from changing 
their public religion of choice, although they should inform the authorities of this “in 
order to avoid all inconveniences in civil relations” (Article 3). It is true that, on pain 
of dismissal, the official clergy of the public confessions must teach the articles of faith 
they were ordained into. Yet the clergy too are free to believe what they like as private 
citizens, with the proviso that, should the strength of their personal beliefs interfere 
with their ordained public preaching, they should relinquish their office (Article 8). 
This kind of freedom is not of course Wood’s Kantian conception of action in 
accordance with freely self-imposed universal principles of reason; but it is a 
conception of freedom nonetheless. In fact, alongside its statist toleration and 
regulation of the public confessions, the Edict maintains a negative religious liberty, in 
the form of the right to free private belief and to be left alone in the public religion of 
one’s choice. The overarching political rationale for this religious policy is made clear 
in Article 2: 
In addition [to the three main confessions] the Prussian state should 
further maintain the prior specific toleration of the remaining sects and 
religious parties, and at no time visit on any person the least compulsion 
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of conscience; so long as each quietly fulfills his duties as a good 
citizen of the state, keeps any particular opinions to himself, and takes 
care not to spread these or convert others to them, making them err or 
waver in their faith. As each man has to care for his own soul, so he 
must be able to act quite freely in this regard; and in our opinion a 
Christian Regent has only to see to it that the people are instructed by 
teachers and ministers in genuine Christianity, true and unfalsified, thus 
giving each the opportunity to learn and take [this] up for themselves. 
Whether or not a subject wishes to make good use of this generously 
offered opportunity for conviction, must remain at the completely free 
disposal of his own conscience. (Kemper 1996: 227) 
In light of these initial observations, we can begin to modify the standard 
interpretation. If, as these observations suggest, the immediate object of the Edict’s 
concern was not Aufklärung, understood as the free use of reason, that is because it was 
preoccupied by a quite different kind of problem: proselytism. Proselytism infringed 
both sides of Prussian Religionspolitik. On the one hand, it threatened the Imperial 
public-law confessional order to which Prussia was a signatory. In accordance with the 
provisions of the Westphalian religious peace, and in pursuit of a juristic neutralisation 
of confessional conflict, this order had legally recognised a particular balance of 
confessional communities among and within the signatory states (Heckel 1989a; 
Heckel 1989b; Nowak 1995: 26-7). The Edict regards this geopolitical confessional 
order as endangered by secret missionary activities undertaken by the confessions, the 
Catholics in particular (Article 4);10 but also by rationalist Protestant clergy, whose 
deviation from the Augsburg Confession can be so great that they are in effect 
attempting to convert their congregations to a new religion (Articles 7 and 8). On the 
other hand, conversion activities of either kind are also a threat to the private liberty of 
conscience promised by the state to its citizens; that is, to the negative liberty to be left 
undisturbed in their chosen public confession or else in complete religious privacy 
(Article 3). It is possible to suggest, then, that the religious Aufklärung drew the 
negative attention of the Edict not for its rational freedom but as a new source of 
proselytism, able to disturb both the balance of public confessions and the negative 
religious liberty of citizens. 
Before elaborating on this suggestion, however, we must first deal with the 
widely-held view that the Edict’s ostensible concern to manage the confessional 
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balance was really a cover for something else: namely, the spiritual obscurantism of 
state officials bent on using religion to keep the people in a state of docile “self-
incurred immaturity”. Drawing on Schwartz (1925) and Schultze (1964), Wood 
doesn’t hesitate to characterise Frederick William as a “religious fanatic” whose 
capricious nature and mystical inclinations allowed him to be influenced by Wöllner’s 
Rosicrucianism (Wood 1996: xv). In this account, Wöllner’s (undoubted) role as grand 
master of the Berlin Rosicrucian Society allows him to be portrayed as a mystagogue, 
whose misguided or duplicitous commitment to pseudo-religion turned him into an 
enemy of the Aufklärung, and turns the Edict into his weapon against the free use of 
reason in religious matters. 
Recent research by Michael Sauter, however, reveals this view of Wöllner as a 
myth, concocted by his eighteenth-century enemies and perpetuated by modern 
commentators intent on providing their chosen conception of modernity with 
enlightened origins (Sauter 2002a; Sauter 2002b). Wöllner, Sauter points out, was 
educated at the key enlightenment university of Halle and participated in characteristic 
enlightenment associations, among which were the Freemasons and Rosicrucians. In 
addition to producing mythopoeic genealogies of Roscrucianism, Wöllner wrote 
enlightened tracts in which he urged reform in agricultural practices and peasant 
landholding, argued for the abolition of serfdom, and endorsed a state managed system 
of public religions, coupled with the right to private belief. It is important to observe 
that the manner in which Wöllner treated the religious question, in terms of state 
management of the confessional balance, was itself widely regarded as aufgeklärt, 
even — for some of the time at least — by such radical Aufklärer as Biester. In an 
essay expressing characteristic religious anxieties — here regarding the decision by 
some provincial cities to allow Catholics to make use of Lutheran churches — Biester 
asks for the true nature of Aufklärung and then locates this squarely in state religious 
toleration. To tolerate a religious party means to allow it to confess its faith, worship in 
public, appoint pastors, educate the young, and induct them into the faith (Biester 
1784: 182). In continuing his argument, however, the enlightened Biester gives 
symptomatic expression not just to Prussia’s system of religious management, but also 
to the confessional hatreds and conflicts that it was designed to cope with: 
Among others, the Catholics enjoy such toleration in our enlightened 
[aufgeklärten] Prussian state, God be praised; except that they are 
restricted in some inessential matters, which do not concern the essence 
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of their religion and clearly could lead to general disturbance and their 
own injury; for example, that they are not permitted to hold processions 
near us. — Should a religious party be unfortunate enough to count 
among its articles of faith principles that clearly conflict with morality 
or civil society, then the most compliant toleration could not give in to 
this. (Biester 1784: 182-3) 
It thus begins to appear that far from being a covert anti-enlightenment mystagogue, 
Wöllner was the representative of a distinct ‘civil’ enlightenment — centred in the 
system of managed religious toleration — while at least some rational religionists 
adhered to a conception of enlightened reason that was potentially intolerant and 
uncivil. 
This is enough to allow us to return to our suggestion that rather than 
representing an anti-Enlightenment backlash, the Edict was a continuation of Prussia’s 
regime of confessional governance, activated by the public dissemination of rational 
religious doctrines which appeared as a form of proselytism. The first thing to observe 
in this regard is the manner in which the Edict characterises the religious Aufklärung, 
namely, as a cover for a group of intellectual movements that had penetrated 
confessional Protestantism in a sectarian manner, bent on making converts to the 
religion of ‘reason’: “One is not ashamed to again resuscitate the miserable and long-
refuted errors of the Socinians, Deists, Naturalists and other sects, and to spread these 
in a brazen and shameless way among the people under the utterly misused name of 
Aufklärung” (Article 7). For the purposes of the Edict, these overlapping doctrines 
would have been broadly understood, with Socinianism signifying the treatment of 
Christ as a non-divine moral teacher; Deism indicating the relegation of revelation and 
biblical miracles in favour of a rationally known impersonal divine principle; and 
Naturalism the doctrine that scientifically known natural laws were sufficient for 
understanding all things, including man’s moral nature and its perfection. Deeply 
indebted to the anthropology and perfectionism of Leibnizian-Wolffian metaphysics, 
religious rationalism covered a wide cultural spectrum in a variety of forms. It reached 
all the way from the secret societies, where this metaphysics was taught as an esoteric 
knowledge to the illuminati (Mulsow 1998), to the ‘liberal’ Protestant theology of the 
Neologians, who used it to transform confessional religion into perfectionist moral 
philosophy (Aner 1929; Sparn 1985). 
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Given that this religious rationalism was thus itself a concrete theological 
intervention in the Prussian religious settlement, it should be clear that the Edict’s 
strictures against it cannot be understood as an attempt to defend orthodoxy against 
some generic free use of reason. Rather, in prohibiting public attacks on biblical 
revelation and the doctrines of Christ’s atonement and reconciliation, the Edict was 
designed to prevent the conversion of multi-confessional Christianity, understood as a 
public religious system, into the non-sacramental ethical religion of a particular 
cultural faction. In attempting to maintain a minimal sacramental Christianity, the 
Edict was not establishing a theological orthodoxy around such doctrines — doctrines 
which it knew full well were elaborated quite differently across the confessions; rather, 
it was maintaining the sacramental basis of the pastoral work performed by 
confessional religion in its role as popular pedagogy. While allowing freedom of 
private belief, the duty of a Christian prince is thus to “maintain and protect from 
falsification the Christian religion … in its high dignity and original purity, as it is 
taught in the Bible and in accordance with the conviction of each confession of the 
Christian church as prescribed in its particular symbolic books. In this way the poor 
people would not be exposed to the falsehoods of the modish teacher, so that millions 
of our good subjects would not be robbed of their tranquility in life and their comfort 
on the deathbed, and so be made unhappy” (Article 7). 
We may next observe that this attempt to suppress public religious rationalism 
was not the result of a late eighteenth-century backlash against the Frederician 
Enlightenment; rather, it represented a policy that began with the emergence of 
religious rationalism during the seventeenth century and had continued sporadically 
ever since. In 1693, for example, F. W. Stosch was arrested and called before a royal 
commission for publishing the Concordia rationis et fidei (1692). Drawing on a 
mixture of Socinian, Hobbesian, Spinozist and Deist doctrines, Stosch denied Christ’s 
divinity, rejected the reality of miracles and of Hell, and affirmed that the Bible should 
be read allegorically, as an attempt by primitive peoples to understand a God who is in 
effect pantheistically (or metaphysically) identified with the cosmos (Stosch 1992).11 
Before joining Jonathan Israel, however, who views the commission’s decision to 
suppress the book as an early instance of anti-enlightenment reaction (Israel 2001: 641-
5), we should pause to make two observations: firstly, that two of its members, Philip 
Spener and Samuel Pufendorf, were leading representatives of (respectively) the 
religious and civil enlightenments, whose prime concern was the maintenance of a 
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fragile religious peace; and, secondly, that, after the suppression, Stosch was quietly 
restored to his former civil rank and entitlements as privy secretary to the court.12 
When, in 1699, the man who would become Pufendorf’s most famous translator and 
glossator, Jean Barbeyrac, was charged by Berlin’s Huguenot Consistory with 
spreading Socinianism at the French Collège, he was dealt with in a similar way. The 
Brandenburg Privy Council found him guilty of heterodoxy and banned him from 
lecturing on theology, yet refused to countenance the Consistory’s demand for 
excommunication, ruling instead that he could continue to teach philological subjects 
“as a learned and worthy man” (Othmer 1970: 72-4). In both cases the Prussian 
authorities maintained their policy of restricting public dissemination of doctrines 
deemed harmful to the legally ordered balance of confessions, while permitting 
freedom of private belief. Little, apparently, had changed during the reign of the 
aufgeklärt Frederick II, whose minister for religious affairs, Baron von Zedlitz — 
generally tagged as “the enlightened” — applied the same policy to Johann August 
Starck (in 1776) and Johann Heinrich Schulz (in 1783), prohibiting them from the 
public dissemination of their radical religious rationalism, which they were quite free 
to practice in private (Schmidt 1992: 98). In short, without doubting Wöllner’s 
personal animus against the Aufklärer, the Edict he authored did little more than 
continue Prussia’s longstanding policy of inhibiting religious rationalism from 
undermining the confessional balance, although this was becoming ever more difficult. 
This, we may further observe, helps to explain the fluidity of ideological 
positions in the vehement public debate that broke out over the Edict. It is not 
surprising that opposition to the Edict was led by religious rationalists such as Pierre 
Villaume and one of Germany’s first Kantian law professors, Gottlieb Hufeland, from 
the University of Jena. Like the proponents of the standard modern view, most of 
whose arguments they already supply, these rationalists bypass the Edict’s separation 
of public religion and private belief, accuse it of attempting to impose orthodoxy, and 
insist that public institutions must reflect the truth of the individual’s rational 
convictions, even if this means — as Hufeland proclaims — that there must be as 
many churches as there are personal convictions (Hufeland 1788; Villaume 1788). 
Neither is it surprising to find among the Edict’s supporters a retired Brandenburg 
jurisconsult, Rudolpf Weyel, who adhered to a non-Kantian (Pufendorfian) conception 
of natural law, grounded not in the rights of free reason but in the state’s responsibility 
for maintaining peace and security, and for whom Hufeland’s rationalism was a recipe 
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for dissolving all duties of office, leading to anarchy (Weyel 1789). Cutting across 
these fronts, however, is the rebuttal of Villaume’s position undertaken by Johan 
Semler, one of the leading Neologians but also a strong defender of the Edict (Semler 
1788). 
Semler’s position comes closest to comprehending the complex state of cultural 
affairs induced by the Janus face of Prussian Religionspolitik. On the one hand, Semler 
rejects out of hand the allegation that the Edict was an attempt to impose orthodoxy, 
and also the assumption on which Villaume had based this claim: namely, that 
Prussia’s religious constitution should be based on true convictions. Were this to be so, 
Semler argues, then in the end there would only be one truth and one church; but 
Prussia’s religious constitution is a set of public law arrangements dedicated to 
maintaining a plurality of churches, as public bodies each with their own version of 
religious truth (Semler 1788: 11-12, 15-17, 45). This means that the state’s policy is 
grounded not in truth but in the maintenance of public religious peace, and that clergy 
are bound by their oath of office to teach not according to their individual insights but 
according to the articles of faith that define the church as a public body. On the other 
hand, switching perspectives in accordance with the complex culture in which he found 
himself, Semler also argues that, typically, individual Lutheran clergy will teach the 
articles of faith as if they were transcendent truths. Should they find that their personal 
beliefs sometimes vary from the articles of faith then, Semler advises, it is best for 
conscientious clergy to continue to teach the articles in public, while silently waiting 
for their moral refinement which may, in the course of man’s unending moral 
evolution, lead to a resolution (74-6, 80-2, 94-7). We will return to Semler’s 
sophisticated response to the Edict in Section III. For the moment though we may use 
it to observe that, far from being the creature of obscurantist reactionaries, the Edict 
also found support among the religious rationalists; at least among those who accepted 
that transcendent truth could only be pursued within the security envelope of a public-
law confessional system grounded not in truth but social peace. In short, theological 
liberals could readily support the Edict, but only if they were also political liberals. 
We are now in a position to suggest a revised interpretation of the Prussian 
Religious Edict, which we are no longer entitled to regard as the instrument of 
reactionary state intended to suppress the free and enlightened use of reason by 
imposing religious orthodoxy. In place of this view we can begin to see the Edict as an 
instrument re-enforcing a longstanding public-law balance of confessional religions, at 
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the heart of which lay not the affirmation of orthodoxy, but the separation of public 
religion from private belief. The prime objective of this measure was not repression of 
individual heterodoxy but maintenance of the system of multi-confessional toleration, 
through which the Westphalian treaties had established a pacifying distribution of 
confessional communities within and among states. Prussian Religionspolitik had 
operationalised Westphalian Imperial jus publicum through the sophisticated dual 
strategy of public policing of the confessional borders accompanied by acceptance of 
free private belief. Both sides of the strategy testify to the Prussian state’s 
‘secularisation’, in the sense of its juridified withdrawal from the question of 
theological truth (Heckel 1984), so that the Edict’s official endorsement of a multi-
faith Christianity should be seen in terms of the state’s maintenance of the confessional 
system for the purposes of national pastoral pedagogy. 
What the champions of unfettered religious reason chose to ignore — and what 
their modern counterparts choose to forget — is that this confessional balance was 
under continual threat of destabilisation: outside Prussia, in Austria and some southern 
German territories, as result of the re-Catholicising activities of a church that had scant 
regard for the Westphalian settlement (Nowak 1995: 21-30); and inside Prussia as a 
result of abiding interconfessional hatreds, which surfaced not just in Protestant 
sectarians but also in such champions of enlightenment reason as Biester, whose 
commitment to rational truth could itself lead to intolerance. If, as we have suggested, 
the Edict regards proselytism as the prime threat to this order, that is because 
proselytism infringed on both the public confessional balance and the private right of 
citizens to be left alone in their religion, or lack of it. No doubt it seems implausible to 
modern eyes that the religious rationalists were accused of proselytism. After all, how 
can the advancement of doctrines grounded in a universal human reason be seen as an 
attempt to convert anyone to some kind of faith? Yet it was not just Wöllner who 
regarded the rationalists as enthusiastic sectarians; so too did Semler, when he 
criticised them for exalting their own insights over doctrines to whose public teaching 
they were committed by an oath of office. Biester’s enlightened intolerance, and 
Semler’s scepticism regarding the enthusiastic claims for individual reason made by 
the religious rationalists, allow us to pose a different kind of question: What if access 
to the kind of universal reason championed by the rationalists was itself dependent on 
belief in doctrines analogous to the theology of a religious confession? This is the 
question that we shall explore with regards to Kant’s rational theology. If Kant’s 
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rational theology was in fact a variant form of positive theology aimed at transforming 
concrete religious practice, then it too could appear as a form of proselytism, this time 
for the “pure religion of reason”. 
II. Kant’s Pure Religion of Reason 
Modern treatments of Kant’s religious writings as works of pure philosophy — 
grounded in reason, and unindebted to positive theological doctrine — all rely on 
arguments to this effect that were developed by Kant himself. Kant’s arguments, which 
revolve around the claim that his conception of God is modeled on human reason 
rather than vice versa, are, however, neither transparent nor disinterested.13 They are 
not transparent for, as we shall see, Kant’s conception of human reason is itself 
indebted to the traditional metaphysical conception of God, as a divine intellect 
capable of creating the intelligible forms (noumena) that it intuits. Further, in the more 
immediate context with which we are concerned, these arguments were not 
disinterested because Kant believed that if he could convince the Königsberg theology 
faculty to declare his religious writings to be philosophy rather than theology, then he 
would not have to accept the decision of the Immediate Examination Commission, and 
could seek an altogether friendlier vetting by the philosophy faculty of the University 
of Jena. We will return to Kant’s strategy in the final section, concentrating for the 
moment on modern Kantian defences of the philosophical character of Kant’s religious 
writing. 
In seeking to raise Kant’s philosophy of religion above the domain of historically 
transmitted doctrine, modern defenders seek to elevate their own normative approach 
to this philosophy over the descriptive treatment of it as a characteristic expression of 
North German religious rationalism. Claus Dierksmeier’s discussion of what he calls 
Kant’s “noumenon religion” provides a representative instance of this kind of 
defence.14 According to Dierksmeier, Kant’s religious philosophy is grounded not in 
any positive theological doctrine but in Kant’s philosophical reflection on the limits of 
human reason. This reflection shows that the noumenal domain — understood in terms 
of divine intellection and the existence of a universe of pure rational beings — is both 
beyond human (theoretical) understanding, yet remains available as a “standpoint” 
from which to undertake moral judgment and action. Arrived at in this way, through 
the pure philosophical reflection of reason on itself, “The noumenal standpoint is no 
prejudice, but — as a reflective standpoint — [is the] condition of possibility of actual 
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authenticity”. For Dierksmeier, the pressure to unify and transcend diverse forms of 
human understanding and religious worship in favour of the unified noumenal 
standpoint is something that comes from human reason itself: “The question is not 
what we must think about our reason in order to justify something that we already 
believe we know about religion. Rather, the question is whether we must think a 
‘something’ that, in order to be able to think our reason as a systematic whole, we must 
identify as religion or, better as noumenon religion’ (Dierksmeier 1998: 6). 
Ultimately, this “something” turns out to be Kant’s moral law, understood as 
unconditioned or absolute in the sense of being self-prescribed by a universe of 
spiritual beings whose freedom from sensuous self-interest allows them to legislate for 
an intelligible community which is the model for the kingdom of God on earth: “We 
ground ourselves in God when we make our way into the community of spirits 
[Geister], we serve him when we strive to realise the kingdom of intelligible ends on 
earth, we are near him when we orient ourselves to pure practical reason” (182). When 
confronting the question of from whence this noumenal standpoint could arise — given 
that it cannot originate in any merely historical or positive teaching — Dierksmeier 
duplicates Kant’s own answer.15 He argues that it arises from the “transcendental 
conflict” and “ethical asymmetry” which each individual must experience as a being 
who is split between an unconditioned self-determining noumenal nature and a 
conditioned, sensuously determined phenomenal self: “If it is a matter for moral 
philosophy to reveal that the subject must reflexively transcend itself in the face of 
ethical asymmetry in order to remain an ethical subject, so religious philosophy now 
looks more closely at the ‘what’ of such reflections” (77). The “what” of course is the 
noumenal community of intelligible beings that forms the basis of Kant’s moral and 
religious philosophy. 
Those of us who have been spared this transcendental conflict will quickly 
realise, however, that this conception of the divided, intelligible-sensuous subject can 
indeed be taught and learned, as the condition of experiencing the conflict. In fact, an 
extensive scholarship shows that the figure of homo duplex — divided into a rational 
nature capable of spontaneous participation in divine reason and will, and a sensuous 
nature that mires man in the world of space, time and utility — was the core 
anthropology of German university metaphysics. This figure of thought was introduced 
into the German university and monastic system by Albert the Great (Thomassen 
1985), carried into early modernity by post-Reformation Protestant scholasticism 
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(Wundt 1939; Sparn 1976), secularised in Leibniz’s monadology (Schneider 1967; 
Jasinowski 1972; Mulsow 1998), and refurbished by Kant as the anthropological 
underpinning of his moral and religious philosophy (Hunter 2001: 52-8, 98-102, 279-
316; Hunter 2002). 
The anthropology of German university metaphysics can best be understood as 
the instrument of an ascesis designed to establish a particular relation to the self: as a 
being capable of pure rational intuition and self-governance, but distracted by sensuous 
inclinations and desires. Transmitted to students through the teaching of topics dealing 
with the limits of human understanding in relation to the divine mind, this 
anthropology is designed to induce a particular sense of self-dissatisfaction — 
Dierksmeier’s “transcendental conflict” — which is the prelude to a work of 
intellectual self-refinement, imagined in terms of transcendence of the lower sensuous 
self and participation in the community of rational beings.16 The result is the spiritual 
grooming of the metaphysician, culturally recognised as a personage whose inner 
rational self-purification has given them access to the ‘higher’ noumenal standpoint of 
a being no longer mired in the world of space, time and sensuous interests. There are 
thus good prima facie reasons for treating the noumenal standpoint as an intellectual 
deportment grounded in specific positive doctrines and practices of self-cultivation. 
Moreover, as the product of a metaphysical culture formerly responsible for the 
spiritual grooming of a theological elite, this standpoint was inevitably problematic 
when secular philosophers used it to claim a religious insight higher than that available 
within the biblical-sacramental religion of the confessions. This is the conflict that lay 
at the heart of the debate over the North German Protestant Aufklärung. 
Seen in this light, Kant’s rational theology is just what the advocates of its purely 
philosophical character say it is not: a competing positive rationalist theology, 
grounded in its own anthropology and spiritual discipline, and oriented to transforming 
existing sacramental theologies and forms of worship. We can illustrate this point by 
briefly considering Kant’s metaphysical reconstruction of the theology of original sin. 
He undertook this in the first of the two essays he submitted to the Immediate 
Examination Commission — “Concerning the indwelling of the evil principle 
alongside the good, or, Of the radical evil in human nature” — which was cleared for 
publication in the Berlinische Monatsschrift and later published as the first chapter of 
Religion within the Bounds of Reason Alone. As a prefatory comment, we should pause 
to note that at the beginning of the eighteenth century, Christian Thomasius, a leading 
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representative of the civil Aufklärung, had categorically denied the standing of secular 
philosophers to explicate such matters as original sin. These, he argued, were matters 
of faith alone such that, in purporting to explain them, philosophers distended the 
capacities of secular reason, overreached their civil office, and threatened to transform 
properly private faith into enforceable public doctrine (Thomasius 1950). Undeterred 
by such concerns, Kant’s essay proceeds to offer a full-blooded philosophical 
simulation of the doctrine of original sin, departing from both the major confessional 
theologies and from such ‘naturalists’ as K. F. Bahrdt, the radical Aufklärer who 
denied the Fall and insisted on man’s moral self-sufficiency (Bahrdt 1789: 50-9). 
Kant begins with a paradox that was traditional for all of the confessional 
theologies: How can sin be both original, in the sense of given in man’s nature, yet 
simultaneously be a matter of choice for which man may be held morally responsible? 
He then uses this paradox to motivate the transition to his metaphysical perspective. If, 
Kant argues, we view man’s evil nature as the product of an “intelligible deed” (a pure 
intellectual act) performed by an intellectual being outside the world of space and time 
— consisting in fact in this being’s choice to allow itself to be governed by sensuous 
inclinations rather than pure moral reason — then this choice would nonetheless 
appear to time-bound sensible man as an inherent natural propensity to evil. By 
reconstructing the Fall as the “intelligible deed” of a noumenal being, Kant provides a 
novel account of original sin, not as an event occurring in time but as a timeless radical 
evil. This evil is radical or ineradicable in part because nothing that occurs in time can 
touch a timeless deed, but centrally because, as the uncaused timeless choice of a 
noumenal being to allow itself to be governed by sensuous inclinations, it is 
inexplicable: 
Now the former [intelligible deed] is said to be a bare propensity … and 
to be innate, because it cannot be eradicated … But the chief reason [for 
this] is that we are just as incapable of assigning a further cause for why 
evil has corrupted the very highest maxim in us, though this is our own 
deed, as we are for any fundamental attribute that belongs to our nature. 
(VI, 31-2; RRT, 79) 
Kant’s aim is thus not to dissolve the mystery of radical evil, in the manner of the 
naturalists, but to construct a ‘rational’ simulation of the mystery itself, now portrayed 
in terms of the inexplicability of the act by which a free intellectual being chooses to 
mortgage itself to the inclinations of a sensuous nature. One can understand why 
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modern Kantians might seek to offer a further rational reconstruction of Kant’s 
reconstruction; for example, by treating the noumenal choice of a sensuous nature in 
more respectable, formal terms, as the relation between an evil “meta-maxim” and the 
bad practical maxims that it governs (Quinn 1986; Quinn 1988; Allison 2002). To do 
so, however, is to miss the point of Kant’s reconstruction, which is not to do away with 
the mystery of the Fall but to capture its moral power for his own metaphysical 
theology. Kant thus advances a metaphysical simulation of the Fall which transforms it 
from an historical event into the timeless moment in which a noumenal being corrupts 
its own nature, but also into an infinitely repeated event; for now man’s every decision 
to act on sensuous maxims may be regarded as if “he had just stepped out of the state 
of innocence into evil” (VI, 41; RRT, 86). 
In fact, if we consider Kant’s Religion as a whole, then his overall strategy was 
aimed not at the immediate displacement of the Christian Bible, but at positioning his 
metaphysics of religion as its sole legitimate interpreter and its true meaning. Viewing 
it from the noumenal perspective he has just sketched, Kant thus treats the biblical 
story of the Fall as containing a kernel of truth, in the form its transcendent view of 
man’s corruption as an ur-transgression, rather as a than a natural endowment. Yet, 
Kant argues, the story in Genesis covers this inner moral truth with a misleading 
narrative of corruption as an empirical event that occurs to man in history, as the result 
of his seduction by an evil spirit. This story must be seen as a concession to the human 
understanding’s initial weakness when it came to rising from the empirical-historical to 
the noumenal-rational domain: “We must not however seek a temporal origin for a 
moral nature for which we are to be held accountable, even if this is unavoidable when 
we want to explain the contingent existence of this nature (hence the Scriptures, in 
accordance with this weakness of ours, have perhaps so pictured its temporal origin)” 
(VI, 43; RRT, 88). 
Kant thus launches his metaphysical hermeneutics as an alternative to the 
philological or “scholarly” interpretation of the Bible. He regards the “scriptural 
scholar” as responsible for clarifying the biblical text and its literal historical meaning, 
while characterising his own work, as a “scriptural interpreter”, in terms of “forcing” 
the hidden noumenal significance of the Bible from its historical shell, in accordance 
with the criterion of moral improvement rather than philological truth (VI, 114; RRT, 
145). Of course Kant was not alone in offering ‘rational’ moral reinterpretations of the 
biblical mysteries and miracles, as Reimarus and Semler had already gone a long way 
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in this direction. Kant, however, differs from the Neologians in that he converts the 
sacramental mysteries into metaphysical mysteries, grounded in the opaque relation 
between man’s sense-based ‘human’ understanding and the supersensible domain of 
pure intellection in which he participates as a noumenal being. In treating man’s 
actions as a pure intelligence in the noumenal domain as beyond the reach of his 
human understanding, Kant views this domain itself as the source of the mysteries 
partially disclosed in the veiled historical narratives of the Christian Bible. In other 
words, in a remarkable sectarian coup de main, Kant situates his own metaphysical 
hermeneutics not just as one source of morally improving biblical interpretations, but 
as the single authentic revelation through which the world of noumenal beings 
discloses itself in history, in the form of Kant’s own “pure religion of reason”. Kant 
thus understands his hermeneutic purification of historical biblical Christianity as 
heralding the translation of the noumenal community into history, giving the true 
meaning of the biblical promise regarding the building of God’s kingdom on earth: 
The basis for the transition to the new order of things must lie in the 
principle of the pure religion of reason, as a revelation (though not an 
empirical one) permanently taking place within all human beings … We 
have reason to say, however, that ‘the Kingdom of God is come into 
us’, even if only the principle of the gradual transition from 
ecclesiastical faith to the universal religion of reason, and so to a 
(divine) ethical state on earth, has put down roots universally and, 
somewhere, also in public — though the actual setting up of this state is 
still infinitely removed from us. (VI, 122; RRT, 152). 
We should not underestimate the cultural significance of Kant’s metaphysical 
hermeneutics in the context of the Protestant religious Aufklärung. By seeking to make 
this hermeneutics central to German university metaphysics, Kant was reasserting the 
long-standing but always contested claim of university metaphysics to provide 
definitive ‘rational’ explications for the biblical faith of confessional Protestantism. 
Yet he was doing this from outside the church and its theology faculties, on the basis of 
a claimed personal philosophical insight into a noumenal religion in relation to which 
all ecclesial religion was a ‘merely empirical’ approximation. In constructing this 
dominating cultural eyrie — that of secular theological custodian of confessional 
Protestantism’s transcendent truths — Kant was situating himself to make a decisive 
intervention in the war of positions between the religious naturalists and the 
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confessional theologians. For now he could establish ‘dialectical’ relations between 
these positions — that is, relations of reciprocal deficiency in which the theologians’ 
blind attachment to the biblical ‘husk’ of Christianity was matched by the naturalists’ 
loss of transcendent insight. Kant could thus claim for his metaphysical hermeneutic 
the truly extraordinary role of determining the precise point and degree to which 
biblical doctrines could be rationalised, through the revelation of their noumenal 
significance, in a manner suited to the level of humanity’s historical maturation, 
thereby outflanking and triumphing over both the naturalists and the confessional 
theologians.17 
That was the way in which Kant dealt with the crucial doctrine of Christ’s 
vicarious atonement for humanity’s sin. This had been a bone of particular contention 
between the naturalists and the theologians, with the former denying on principle that 
any person could fulfill another’s moral duties, and the latter insisting on the need for 
supernatural grace in order to redeem a nature that was corrupt and incapable at its 
root. In addressing this problem in the second of the essays that he sent to the 
Immediate Examination Commission — “Concerning the battle of the good against the 
evil principle for dominion over the human being” — Kant performs his dialectical 
outflanking manoeuvre by accepting both that vicarious atonement is morally 
impossible and that man’s nature is radically evil. He then ‘transcends’ the conflict by 
treating the biblical Christ as a symbol of the pure noumenal being within everyone. 
This noumenal being is the ideal of goodness, biblically understood as “humanity 
pleasing to God”. In experiencing the pain of going over to this ideal, the “Old Man” in 
us becomes a “New Man”, so that the person in effect atones for himself and saves 
himself through an act of transcendent moral self-regeneration (VI, 60-78; RRT, 103-
117).18 Given this metaphysical simulation of vicarious atonement, we can conclude 
not only that Kant’s religious writing was grounded in a positive historical doctrine — 
centrally in the anthropology and noumenal standpoint of university metaphysics — 
but that this writing took the form of a concrete intervention in a religious-cultural 
conflict in which Kant himself was a combatant.19 
Kant’s interpretation of Christ — as the merely sensory symbol for an act of 
moral self-regeneration performed by noumenal man on himself — would have been 
enough by itself to secure the Commission’s rejection of his second essay, which is 
probably the result he wanted. More broadly though, in relation to our larger argument 
regarding the Religious Edict, it would seem that Kant’s religious writings would 
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indeed have fallen quite naturally within the Edict’s strictures against proselytism. If 
we combine the account we have just given of these writings — as a positive 
theological intervention in the battle over the religious Aufklärung — with our earlier 
account of the Edict, as a measure proscribing proselytism in order to maintain the 
public confessional balance, then there can be little doubt that Kant’s religious essays 
were proselytism in the required sense. In publicly teaching that the existing 
confessions represented only the empirical shell of a quite different ‘higher’ noumenal 
religion which was destined to displace them, Kant was both undermining the public-
law confessional system and infringing the negative right of citizens to be left 
undisturbed in their chosen belief, or lack of such. 
Kant’s immediate proselytes were of course his students at the University of 
Königsberg, boys whose average starting age was 16, the majority of whom studied 
metaphysics with Kant as part of their training as the future school-teachers, 
academics, and clergy of East and West Prussia (Stark 1995). For these boys, the offer 
of grooming in a discipline that promised access to the metaphysical persona and the 
noumenal standpoint must have been all but irresistible. Beyond his immediate 
students, Kant was also pleased to see his metaphysics capturing other university 
faculties in which Protestant Germany’s intellectual elite was being formed. By the late 
1780s Kant’s students were fanning-out from Königsberg, sometimes carrying 
manuscripts of his lecture notes, including his lectures on philosophical theololgy. 
These were used by newly Kantianised professors to do battle with the Wolffians, and 
to establish beachheads for Kant’s metaphysics, as Johan Bering did at the University 
of Marburg in Hesse-Kassel (Stark 1996). Similar events were occurring at the 
University of Jena, where the Kantian capture of the philosophy, law and theology 
faculties between 1785-1800 was surprisingly swift, and where, as we have noted, 
Gottlieb Hufeland rose to prominence as one of the first Kantian natural jurists 
(Lingelbach 1995). Hufeland’s attack on the Religious Edict — which he derided as an 
attempt to impose orthodoxy on the free inner convictions of reason — may thus be 
regarded as an early symptom of both the future success of Kantian proselytism, and 
the future incapacity of true Kantian believers to grasp the legal and political 
arrangements that permitted them to adopt the noumenal standpoint in relative safety. 
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III. Warring Enlightenments 
The set of religious and political arrangements reaffirmed in the Edict of July 1788 
represented the leading edge of a Religionspolitik that had been continuously evolving 
since the Religious Peace of Augsburg in 1555.20 These measures were focused on a 
single European-wide problem — how to exercise stable and legitimate political 
authority over multi-confessional societies — although the Brandenburg-Prussian 
solution differed significantly from those evolving in France and England. Through its 
dual strategy of establishing a set of legally recognised confessions while permitting 
freedom of private belief, the Prussian state sought to maintain the pacified 
confessional system as a variegated public religion, while declaring the state’s 
agnosticism regarding the ultimate truth of any religious, philosophical or ideological 
position. Unlike the cases of France and England where, in different ways, a state 
church could ensure congruence between religious and political legitimacy, Prussian 
Religionspolitik was forced to deal with the uniquely difficult problem: how to provide 
normative legitimacy for the state independently of the theological and moral truths 
that defined its confessional communities. 
I have discussed elsewhere the manner in which the natural law tradition 
inaugurated by Samuel Pufendorf attempted to meet this challenge (Hunter 2001: 148-
96). For our present purposes it will be enough to recall two central and interrelated 
elements of Pufendorf’s legitimation of the desacralised state. First, Pufendorf realised 
that if civil authority were to be legitimated independently of the moral theologies and 
philosophies associated with the major religions, it would be necessary to reject the 
idea of a single transcendent source of moral obligation, whether this lay in Protestant 
conscience or a transcendental moral law. He thus showed how such universal 
foundations could be replaced by a diversified ethics of office, capable of reflecting a 
new plurality of sources of obligation.21 Second, he separated the civil offices of 
sovereign and citizen from the ecclesial offices of teacher and auditor, stipulating that 
civil duties derive from the exchange of protection for obedience, religious duties from 
relations of wisdom and love (Pufendorf 2002). In this way, Pufendorf enacted a 
fundamental division between the “civil kingdom” and the “kingdom of truth”: in the 
former, coercive power would be exercised for the purposes of social peace 
independently of ultimate truths; in the latter, transcendent truths would be imparted 
free of all civil coercion. This fundamental pluralisation of the moral domain held the 
key to the legitimacy of Prussian Religionspolitik, and formed the background to the 
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positions adopted by those engaged in the conflict over the Protestant religious 
Aufklärung. I shall close by sketching the historical significance of three of these. 
Prussian Religionspolitik found one of its most articulate exponents in Carl 
Gottlieb Svarez. In addition to being a state jurisconsult and privy councilor, Svarez 
was both an author of the Prussian civil code and a member of the 
Mittwochsgesellschaft, the private enlightenment debating society whose members also 
numbered Biester and Gedike, the editors of the Berlinische Monatsschrift, and Moses 
Mendelssohn, the celebrated enlightenment philosopher. In their debate over the 
cultural effect of religious rationalism on a confessionalised population, while all 
members agreed that there needed to be some way of regulating the impact of 
Aufklärung, they differed significantly over how this was to be achieved. Against 
Mendelssohn’s view that this could be left to the discretion of individual enlighteners 
— because the truth would manifest itself progressively in any case — Svarez argued 
in favour of the existing variegated censorship regime. This restricted publications 
likely to disturb the public religion of the people, but allowed relatively unfettered 
publication of scholarly tracts (Schmidt 1989: 282-4). 
The underpinning rationale for the position Svarez adopted towards the religious 
Aufklärung at the Mittwochsgesellschaft was elaborated in the Lectures on Law and 
State, which he gave as part of the political education of the Prussian Crown Prince in 
1791-92. Here, he presented the future king with a clear exposition of the dual strategy 
organising Prussian religious policy. On the one hand, Svarez instructed his charge: 
“Insofar as we regard the Regent simply as the head of civil society, all his rights over 
religious associations flow solely from the rights of general supervision, through which 
he must ensure that no associations are tolerated in the state which are contrary to the 
ends of the state and endanger public peace and security”. On this basis, it is legitimate 
for the state to examine religious confessions to ensure that they are compatible with 
social peace; to make sure that religious parties attempt to exercise no corporate rights 
beyond those enunciated by the law; and to prevent controversies between opposed 
confessions from disturbing the public religious peace. On the other hand, Svarez also 
impressed upon his student that: “The state can never and under no circumstances be 
justified in prescribing what a religious association should teach or how it should order 
its form of worship”. Further: “The state can never prohibit the practice of a religion 
merely on the grounds of its dogmatic principles”. In giving the reason for the state’s 
agnosticism regarding religious principles, Svarez reveals the true ground of his 
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difference from Mendelssohn and the philosophers: “Purely dogmatic concepts and 
opinions of God and divine things, of the relation of man to the Godhead, of his 
condition after death, no matter how false and incorrect, can never have a harmful 
influence on civil life and the duties that a man owes to his neighbour or the state” 
(Svarez 1960: 504-6). In short, if religious falsehoods are not harmful to civil life and 
duties, and may thus be left undisturbed by the enlighteners, then religious truths are 
not beneficial to the civil kingdom, and should form no part of the state’s political 
principles. This restatement of Prussian Religionspolitik, in which the state should 
practice a dual system of regulated confessional toleration and free private belief was 
conditioned by the fundamental political principle that in order to achieve civil 
flourishing the state must govern independently of all ultimate truths. 
Johan Semler’s defence of the Religious Edict is remarkable in that it represents 
the position of a theologian who accepts this political rationale for the confessional 
system, but views it from the perspective of one of the tolerated confessions. As we 
have already noted, Semler recognises that the Edict is designed to maintain a balance 
of public confessions in accordance with jus publicum and the state’s concern for 
social peace (Semler 1788: 11-12, 33-5). In rejecting Pierre Villaume’s purist 
insistence that religion must be grounded the individual’s conviction of truth, Semler 
also drew the same conclusion as Svarez from the public-legal character of the 
confessional system: namely, that this system exists not to give expression to a single 
transcendent truth, but for the purpose of maintaining the several truths that the 
different confessions are permitted to teach as a matter of public right (15, 66-7). 
According to Semler: “The public protection that secures the seven doctrinal systems 
[recognised by the Edict] is a civil, political measure of the King. He protects not seven 
contradictory truths, as the author (Villaume) so ungraciously puts it, but seven 
religious parties in his state, so far as this concerns its public religious order” (107). 
At the same time, in a crucial shift of perspective, Semler also argues that as far 
as Lutheran clergy are concerned, they will teach their doctrines as transcendent truths, 
not simply because they contribute to civil peace. Moreover, they will also participate 
in the hermeneutic refinement of biblical Christianity, in accordance with progress in 
morality and knowledge (74-6). Semler mediates this difficult relation — between the 
state management of religions on the basis of civil peace and the religious care of souls 
on the basis of transcendent truth — not via a unifying dialectical philosophy, but 
through his own version of the pluralising ethics of office. The clergyman’s duties 
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arise not from his putative existence as a rational individual, but from the office he 
holds as a teacher in one of several public confessions. There never will be a unified 
religion grounded in agreed principles, in part because man is an essentially immoral 
creature, and in part because the moral world is inhabited by different “species” (24-5). 
For this reason, where his private views depart from the doctrines of his confession, it 
is an abuse of his office for a clergyman either to preach his opinions from the pulpit 
— as if a religion should be grounded in his personal insights — or to attack the 
Religious Edict on this basis, as if his office were identical to that of the cabinet 
minister’s (102-6). It is also as the occupant of a religious office — and not as a 
rational individual in touch with a ‘higher’ noumenal religion — that the clergyman 
will participate in the hermeneutic clarification of biblical doctrine, the truth of which 
does not depend on his personal insight. As far as the doctrine of vicarious atonement 
is concerned, for example, Villaume is wrong to label as a liar a clergyman who 
continues to teach this doctrine while privately doubting it; for, if an individual’s 
personal opinions cannot make this doctrine true, neither can they make it a lie, as its 
truth is dependent on its place in the church rather than the individual’s mind (94-9). In 
other words, it is the architecture of multiple moral personae that allows Semler to 
maintain congruity between the state’s agnostic management of the confessions and the 
confessional proclamation of truth. By treating the moral clarification of such doctrines 
as vicarious atonement as something undertaken by the church and the clergyman in 
his ‘official’ persona, Semler is able to acknowledge that the office of sovereign or 
cabinet minister will never be grounded in the truth of such a clarification, but in the 
fact that there will always be several of these to be managed in an agnostic manner. 
Now we are able to elucidate Kant’s position in the conflict over the Protestant 
Aufklärung. Several scholars have argued that Kant’s conception of enlightenment, as 
the free public use of reason, possessed the capacity to transcend (what they take to be) 
the impasse or aporia between the political conception of Aufklärung defended by 
Svarez and the rationalist one advanced by figures like Mendelssohn. These scholars 
pay particular attention to Kant’s anomalous use of the public-private distinction in his 
“What is Enlightenment?” essay of 1784. Here Kant inverts the standard usage by 
labelling the official use of reason (by clergy and state officials) “private”, while 
continuing to accept that this must be restricted in accordance with state interest. At the 
same time, he labels the personal use of reason by scholars “public”, denying that this 
can or should be restricted by the state, as it represents the free public use of reason 
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that leads to Aufklärung (VIII, 36-9; KPW, 55-7). It has been argued that this 
represents a significant step towards modernity because, in allowing clergy to freely 
reflect on church doctrine in their capacity as scholars addressing the reading public, 
Kant shows how state and church might be given an enlightened grounding in the free 
public use of reason. (Schmidt 1989; Schmidt 1992; Laursen 1996). 
Despite its significant contribution to the historical contextualisation of Kant’s 
conception of Aufklärung, this interpretation, however, can only appear implausible in 
light of the preceding discussion. In particular, we must recall that for Kant the rational 
clarification of ‘official’ ecclesial religion takes place not through some kind of public 
debate, but only through the self-revelation of the “pure religion of reason”, which is to 
say, only through those equipped with the metaphysical hermeneutics capable of 
winnowing the biblical husks from the noumenal kernel. Kant’s inverted use of the 
public-private distinction should thus be regarded not a potential breakthrough to an 
enlightened public sphere but as a corrosive attack on the foundations of Prussian 
Religionspolitik on behalf of a particular academic-cultural faction. For, by labeling the 
public order of confessional offices “private”, Kant was in effect removing this order 
from its sources of legitimation in the public-law measures through which Prussia had 
sought to maintain the confessional peace. Further, by recategorising the clergy’s 
personal journalistic participation in the debate over the religious Aufklärung as 
“public”, Kant was in fact supplanting the political-legal meaning of the term — as the 
sphere of external civil conduct governed for the purposes of social peace — with a 
quite different metaphysical construction: namely, public as the reciprocal 
transparency of will between the self-governing rational beings who formed Kant’s 
noumenal community.22 In short, Kant’s advocacy of the free public use of reason was 
in fact an extension of his sectarian attempt to capture the religious Aufklärung for his 
own version of university metaphysics, and to delegitimate the public confessional 
order by treating this as lacking a basis in the true sovereignty of the community of 
rational beings. 
Kant’s conception of Aufklärung was thus utterly inimical to the agnosticism 
regarding ultimate truths required by the Prussian management of confessional 
multiplicity; but it was no less inimical to the sophisticated pluralisation of moral 
offices through which Semler reconciled his religious vocation with this system of 
management. In conceiving morality in terms of the self-legislation of a noumenal 
community, and in conceiving religion as the historical actualisation of this community 
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through purification of the empirical Scriptures and confessions, Kant’s metaphysics 
fuelled a spiritual universalism that was radically hostile to both civil and religious 
pluralism. Unlike Semler, Kant thus refused to accept the permanent division of 
confessions, as indicative of an ineradicable moral division, arguing instead that 
ultimately, while there may be several empirical confessions, there is only one true 
religion: the “pure religion of reason” which will eventually supplant confessional 
division through the progressive revelation of a pure moral religion.23 There is thus in 
Kant no abiding justification for religious toleration. Further, unlike Svarez, Kant 
refused to accept that the state’s toleration of confessional diversity requires that it 
refrain from endorsing all ultimate moral principles. Instead, he envisaged the 
progressive emergence of an “ethical state”, grounded in the ultimate principles of a 
self-legislating moral community.24 
Conclusion 
Four years prior to the Religious Edict, in his “What is Enlightenment?” essay 
published in the Berlinische Monatsschrift in 1784, Kant had already spelled out the 
consequences of his noumenal standpoint for any attempt to maintain an agreed set of 
public religious doctrines: 
I reply that this is quite impossible. A contract of this kind, concluded 
with a view to preventing all further enlightenment of mankind for ever, 
is absolutely null and void, even if it is ratified by the highest power, by 
Imperial Parliaments, and the most solemn peace treaties. One age 
cannot enter into an alliance on oath to put the next age in a position 
where it would be impossible for it to extend and correct its knowledge, 
particularly in such important matters, or to make any progress 
whatsoever in enlightenment. This would be a crime against human 
nature, whose original destiny lies precisely in such progress. Later 
generations are thus perfectly entitled to dismiss these agreements as 
unauthorised and criminal. To test whether any particular measure can 
be agreed upon as a law for a people, we need only ask whether a 
people could well impose such a law upon itself. (VIII, 39; KPW, 57) 
Kant is right about one thing at least: the people of Brandenburg-Prussia could not 
have agreed to impose the Religious Edict on itself, as this law was premised on the 
long and violent history of intractable religious division among this people and its 
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religions, each of which sought supremacy over the others. Far from being a 
touchstone for its illegitimacy, however, this fact was central to the ‘Pufendorfian’ 
legitimation of legislation whose role was to maintain the religious peace through the 
public-law management of a system of tolerated confessions. That such legislation 
should have appeared illegitimate to Kant — and that it should continue to appear so to 
modern Kantians — hinges on the belief that Kant’s own metaphysical conception of a 
self-legislating community of rational beings was itself something more than just 
another of the competing enlightenment doctrines; that it represents instead moral 
reason’s own recovery of its noumenal grounds. By rejecting this belief, and treating 
Kant’s metaphysics of religion in a different way — as a positive doctrine grounded in 
the spiritual grooming of the metaphysical personage and spread through academic 
proselytising — I have shown how this Prussian metaphysician’s intervention in the 
conflict over the religious Aufklärung can be seen in a new light. It should be seen, I 
have argued, as a sectarian attempt to capture the rationalisation of biblical-
confessional Christianity on behalf of an academic cultural faction whose enthusiasm 
for the “pure religion of reason” meant that it could no longer tolerate a purely political 
management of religion. If this view can be sustained, then we can say that the attempt 
to censor Kant’s second religious essay signaled neither the end of the Aufklärung nor 
the futility of all attempts to halt the progress of human reason and enlightenment. 
Rather, it was a fairly minor instance of the means by which the Prussian state sought 
to maintain the religious peace, in this case by controlling the proselytising of factions 
whose commitment to the purity of their own principles left them contemptuous of a 
‘merely empirical’ but quite indispensable political modus vivendi. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1  Translations of German texts are my own, except where otherwise noted. 
Kant’s works are cited in text, first via the volume and page number of the 
Akademie edition (Kants Gesammelte Schriften, German Academy of Sciences, 
de Gruyter, Berlin, 1902-), and then via page numbers to relevant volumes of 
the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, abbreviated as follows: 
 KPW: Kant: Political Writings. Hans Reiss (ed.), H. B. Nisbet (trans.), 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970. 
 PP: Practical Philosophy. Mary J. Gregor (ed. and trans.), Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
 RRT: Religion and Rational Theology. Allen W. Wood and George di 
Giovanni, (eds. and trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
2  The Examination Commission, directed by G. F. Hilmer and J. T. Hermes, was 
‘immediate’ in the sense of being directly responsible to the King, having been 
established by Frederick William II in May 1791 as a result of the perceived 
laxness of the Berlin Superior Consistory in vetting rationalist religious 
publications. 
3  The full texts of the Religious Edict and the Censorship Edict are given as 
appendices in Kemper (1996). 
4  For other studies sharing these assumptions to varying degrees, see Schwartz 
(1925), Epstein (1966), Beiser (1992), Di Giovanni (1996) and Saine (1997). 
5  Dirk Kemper’s microfiche edition of texts from the debate generated by the 
Edict has performed an invaluable service in this regard (Kemper 1996). 
Hubatsch’s social histories of the Prussian church and state have recently been 
supplemented by Kurt Nowak’s history of Christianity in Germany (Hubatsch 
1968, 1983). Nowak’s chapter on the Aufklärung notes that the Edict was 
supported by key enlightenment theologians who regarded it as a public law 
measure to maintain the Westphalian religious peace, which was far from 
secure, particularly in some Catholic cities and territories (Nowak 1995: 15-36). 
New work by Michael Sauter promises to revise the usual understanding of 
Wöllner, showing that despite his Roscrucianism and opposition to rationalist 
religious doctrines, Wöllner was in many regards a typical representative of the 
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civil enlightenment, dedicated to social, cultural, and economic reform (Sauter 
2002a; Sauter 2002b; Sauter 2002c). 
6  Kemper’s collection is again crucial, and Kemper’s own discussion of the 
violence of Aufklärung debate is important . Among the works developing a 
more historically informed sense of the Aufklärung’s religious focus are several 
key books and essay collections (Aner 1929; Bödeker and Herrmann 1987; 
Reventlow, Sparn et al. 1988; Gründer and Rengstorf 1989; Hinske 1989; 
Kemper 1989; Martens 1990; Albrecht, Engel et al. 1994; Ischreyt 1995; 
Schmidt 1996; Donnert 1997), and several important essays (Sparn 1985; 
Bödeker 1989; Schmidt 1989; Sparn 1989; Schmidt 1992). 
7  Of particular interest in this regard are two essays by Jörg Baur and Walter 
Sparn, written from a Lutheran perspective, providing valuable insights into 
Kant’s philosophical theology as a rival kind of theological orthodoxy (Baur 
1997; Sparn 1991). 
8  The founding text for this approach remains Bohatec (1938). 
9  In addition to the following problems of interpretation, Wood’s abstraction 
from the actual provisions of the Edict is also reflected in a certain insouciance 
regarding the historical facts of his case. We can see in his statement that: 
“What in fact turned out to affect Kant most directly, however, was not the 
edict governing religious instruction, but a second religious edict of December 
19, 1788, suppressing irreligious writings and empowering the Immediate 
Commission of Investigation to censor of [sic] all books and periodicals 
published in Berlin that dealt with moral or religious topics” (Wood 1996: xix). 
As we have already noted, the December edict was in fact only a renewal of the 
censorship arrangements that had been in force under the ‘enlightened’ 
Frederick II. It neither suppressed irreligious writings in any new way, nor 
empowered the Immediate Examination Commission to censor all publications 
dealing with moral or religious topics. This is because the Commission did not 
come into existence until two and a half years after the censorship edict of 
December 1788, on 14 May 1791, when it was established by cabinet order, as 
an instrument through which Wöllner and the King sought to bypass the Berlin 
Superior Consistory (Kemper 1996: 105). The Consistory was empowered by 
the edict of December 1788 (and the prior edicts that it renewed) to vett all 
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Prussian publications dealing with philosophy and religion, except for works 
published by universities, but had proved less than willing to crack down on 
religious rationalism. 
10  In this fear of re-Catholicisation the authorities were joined by many Aufklärer, 
not from any concern for the Westphalian peace as such, but because they 
regarded Catholicism as a backward yet dangerous superstition. In addition to 
publishing Kant as the apostle of pure reason, J. E. Biester thus also wrote and 
published several articles in the Berlinische Monatsschrift warning of the 
unremitting secret work of Catholic missionaries. See, for example, Biester 
(1784). 
11  For an account of the cultural milieu see Schröder (1987). 
12  For more on these points, and on the generally accepted role of official 
censorship in early modern Germany, see the exemplary study by Döring 
(1995). 
13  A characteristic statement of Kant’s position is given in the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals: “But where do we get the concept of God as the highest 
good? Solely from the idea of moral perfection that reason frames a priori and 
conjoins inseparably with the concept of a free will” (IV, 408-9; PP, 63). 
14  For other versions of this defence, see Lötzsch (1976), Winter (1976), Wood 
(1978), Wimmer (1990), and Wood (1991). 
15  Kant’s own argument — that an unavoidable inner conflict between man’s 
moral reason and sensuous inclinations forces everyone to embark on the quest 
for a pure morality and thence a moral metaphysics — is given in Parts I and III 
of the Groundwork. For a discussion, see Hunter (2002). 
16  We can find a typical formulation of this, again from the Groundwork, in 
Kant’s argument that even a “scoundrel”, when presented with examples of true 
morality, will seek this kind of purity: 
He [the scoundrel] cannot indeed bring this about in himself, though 
only because of his inclinations and impulses; yet at the same time he 
wishes to be free from such inclinations, which are burdensome to 
himself. Hence he proves, by this, that with a will free from sensuous 
impulses he transfers himself in thought into an order of things 
altogether different from that of his desires in the field of sensibility … 
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He believes himself to be this better person when he transfers himself to 
the standpoint of a member of the intelligible world. He is involuntarily 
constrained to do so by the idea of freedom, that is, of independence 
from determining causes in the sensible world; and from this standpoint 
he is conscious of a good will that, by his own admission, constitutes 
the law for his evil will as a member of the world of sense — a law of 
whose authority he is aware even when he transgresses it. (IV, 454-5; 
PP, 101; translation modified) 
17  It is in this regard that I disagree with Steven Lestition’s informative account of 
Kant’s role in the Protestant Aufklärung. Lestition argues that Kant’s dialectical 
approach aimed to encourage the opposed positions to acknowledge their 
reciprocal limitations, with a view to fostering a more pluralistic acceptance of 
religious and cultural differences (Lestition 1993: 108-12). The condition of 
ascribing such a reciprocal deficiency though — in which the confessional 
theologians can be regarded as clutching at the merely historical form of a 
religion into which the naturalists lack all transcendent insight — is that one 
must have first accepted Kant’s metaphysics of religion, which is aimed at 
nothing less than Aufhebung of its mutually deficient rivals. 
18  This best short discussion of Kant’s metaphyiscal simulation of atonement is 
provided by Walter Sparn (Sparn 1991). 
19  Baur (1997) comes to a similar conclusion, arguing that Kant’s rational 
theology should be seen as a competing orthodoxy. 
20  For an overview see Heckel (1983, 1989a, 1992). 
21  See in particular Chapter 1, Book I of Pufendorf’s De jure naturae et gentium 
(1672), where he argues that moral duties flow not from a universal essence, 
soul, or law, but from “moral entities” (entia moralia), understood as a plurality 
of convention-based moral personae, instituted for a variety of civil and 
religious, public and private purposes (Pufendorf 1934: 3-21). For further 
discussion, see the important essays by Haakonssen (2003) and Seidler (2002). 
22  Anyone who has looked through Kemper’s collection will be aware of just how 
far removed scholarly debate over the religious Aufklärung was from Kant’s 
conception of rational beings approaching enlightenment through the free 
public use of reason. Those who did follow the motto of Sapere aude! and 
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dared make free public use of their own reason created not an irenic intellectual 
transparency but a battlefield filled with sectarian intellectual conflicts. For the 
most part, these are characterised by the zealous affirmation of ‘rational 
convictions’, mutual vilification by those holding opposing positions, contempt 
for the “idiots” standing in the way of Aufklärung, and a remorseless will to 
annihilate ideological enemies by refusing to stop publishing replies, until the 
truth has triumphed. 
23  Consider the following passage from The Conflict of the Faculties: “In what 
really deserves to be called religion, there can be no division into sects (for 
since religion is one, universal and necessary, it cannot vary). But there can 
well be division into sects with regard to ecclesiastical faith, whether it is based 
merely on the Bible or on tradition as well, to the extent that belief in what is 
merely the vehicle of religion is taken as an article of religion” (VII, 48; RRT, 
272). 
24  Kant contrasts the ethical state with the political state, from which it will 
emerge, at the beginning of Part III of the Religion: “In accordance with its 
letimotif, a union of human beings merely under laws of virtue can be called an 
ethical society and, so far as these laws are public, an ethico-civil (in contrast to 
a juridico-civil) society, or an ethical commonwealth” (VI, 94; RRT, 130). 
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